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PUBLIC ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS: RICHMOND
NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia1 is, in the words of Justice Ste-
vens, a "watershed case." 2 For the first time, the Court recognized that
some sort of first amendment right of access to government proceedings
exists. The Court, in a plurality opinion (joined by two Justices, accompa-
nied by five concurring opinions and one dissent), held that the right of
the public to attend criminal trials is "implicit in the guarantees of the
First Amendment." '
Richmond Newspapers was handed down exactly one year after the
Court announced Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.4 In Gannett, the Court re-
jected a newspaper chain's challenge of the constitutionality of a judge's
order excluding the press and public from a pretrial suppression hearing
in a highly publicized 5 murder prosecution. However, Justice Stewart's
opinion for the plurality strayed beyond a consideration of the facts
before the Court. Gannett seemed to say that the public has no sixth
amendment right to attend criminal trials. Even if the public has a first
amendment right to attend, the Gannett decision stated it was given "all
appropriate deference"' by the trial court. Despite the Chief Justice's im-
plicit warning that Gannett must be read narrowly in light of its facts,5
the resulting confusion was, as noted in Richmond Newspapers,9 both
widespread and deep. Indeed, it fueled the arguments which led to the
latter decision.
1. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
2. Id. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring.)
3. Id. at 2829.
4. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
5. Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that the lower courts had exaggerated the level of
publicity surrounding the case. He produced evidence which indicated that the newspaper
accounts were not unusual in their frequency or their vigor. He also noted that the two
Gannett papers serving Seneca County, the forum of the trial, had very small circulation
there. Id. at 406-11.
6. In Richmond Newspapers, Justice Blackmun calculated that the Gannett Court had
referred to closed trials at least twelve times. 100 S. Ct. at 2841.
7. 443 U.S. at 392.
8. Id. at 394.
9. 100 S. Ct. at 2841-42 nn.1 & 2.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Two reporters employed by Richmond Newspapers, Inc. were present
at the Hanover County, Virginia, courthouse on September 11, 1978 to
cover the fourth murder trial of John Paul Stevenson. His previous trials
had ended in a conviction, subsequently overturned by the Virginia Su-
preme Court,20 and two mistrials. At the start of the September trial,
defense counsel moved to exclude all spectators from the courtroom. He
expressed concern over difficulties "with information between jurors'" 2
and the possibility that published accounts of the trial might reach the
jurors. The prosecutor declined comment. Judge Taylor then ordered the
courtroom cleared of all spectators on the basis of his authority under a
Virginia statute.1 3 No one objected to the order until the hearing on the
newspaper's motion to vacate the closure order which Judge Taylor had
scheduled for the end of the day. At that hearing, Judge Taylor .agreed
with the defense counsel's arguments for closure and voiced his own con-
cern that the presence of the public in the courtroom was distracting to
the jury. At the same time, he acknowledged that these might not be very
good reasons." Nevertheless, the trial proceeded to its end the next day
and Stevenson was declared not guilty after Judge Taylor struck the
Commonwealth's evidence. 15 The Virginia Supreme Court later ruled
against the newspaper's petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus,
10. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779 (1977) (conviction over-
turned because Stevenson's bloody shirt had been improperly admitted into evidence).
11. The first mistrial occurred when no alternate was available to replace a juror who was
excused because of a nervous disorder. The second mistrial was declared because a venire-
man shared information obtained from newspaper articles about the trial with other venire-
men. Brief for Appellants. at 3, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814
(1980).
12. 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
13. Id. VA. CODE ANN. [[ 19.2-266 (RepL VoL 1975 & Supp. 1980) reads in pertinent part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence
would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a
public trial shall not be violated.
The Virginia Supreme Court has construed this statute as applying primarily to spectators.
It has held that the Virginia General Assembly intended that the statute further the goal of
a fair trial for all litigants. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 682, 232 S.E.2d 741, 742
(1977). In another decision, an order based on the statute was held violative of the accused's
right to a public trial under VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Cumbee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1132,
254 S.E.2d 112 (1979) (total closure not justified merely because of the "type of case").
14. 100 S. Ct. at 2819 (quoting Transcript of September 11, 1978 Hearing on Motion to
Vacate at 11-20).
15. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. The trial was tape recorded and Judge Taylor's reasons for striking
the evidence were garbled. Brief for Appellants at 42 n.37.
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citing Gannett without comment26
Ill. BASIS OF JURISDICTION
The Justices disputed the basis of the Court's jurisdiction; decision on
this issue was postponed until the Court considered the merits. 17 Rich-
mond Newspapers had sought appellate reviewla primarily because it
wished to have Virginia's court closure statute declared unconstitu-
tional.19 Justices Brennan and Marshall were sympathetic to this argu-
ment,20 but the Court held that the proper jurisdictional basis was by writ
of certiorari and considered the case as an attack on the constitutionality
of Judge Taylor's order itself."1 In so doing, the Court avoided a direct
questioning of the constitutionality of the Virginia statute and, by impli-
cation, court closure statutes of other states.2 2 Instead, the Court's hold-
ing limits judges' discretion in issuing closure orders in criminal trials,
whether that discretion derives from statutory or common law authority.
IV. GANNETT CLARIFIED
At the outset of Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices White and
Stevens, moved to restrict Gannett's scope. The Court stated that in
Gannett it "was not required to decide whether a right of access to trials,
as distinguished from hearings on pretrial motions, was constitutionally
guaranteed."22 The Court interpreted Gannett to stand only for the pro-
position "that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of a pub-
lic trial [gives]. . .neither the public nor the press an enforceable right of
16. 100 S. Ct. at 2820.
17. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 896 (1979) (memorandum opinion).
18. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1948).
19. Brief for Appellants at 14-20.
20. 100 S. Ct. at 2839. They would have declared VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 unconstitu-
tional because it authorizes trial closures at the "unfettered discretion of the judge and
parties." Id.
21. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. See 28 U.S.C. § 2103 (1962) (providing for consideration by writ of
certiorari where Supreme Court review is improvidently taken by appeal).
22. Many states permit trial closures by statute under unusual circumstances. See, e.g.,
Amz. R. CaIm. P. 9.3(b) (1968) (on application of defendant if court finds a clear and pres-
ent danger to fair trial); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5 (West 1981) (rape cases at defendant's
request); IOWA CODE ANN. § 605.16 (West 1980-81) (where agreed to by parties); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 278, §§ 16A-16C (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (crimes of minors, husband and
wife cases, and those involving incest or rape); MINN. STAT ANN. § 631.04 (West 1981) (no
spectators under 17 years of age).
23. 100 S. Ct. at 2821 (emphasis in original).
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access to a pretrial suppression hearing."'24 Justice Rehnquist disagreed
with these findings in dissent and recalled his concurring opinion in Gan-
nett where he argued that the constitutional questions in such cases are
for lower courts to resolve.25 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to its own
resolution, noting "that the precise issue presented here has not previ-
ously been before this Court for decision. '26
V. THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
The Court's analysis focuses upon inquiries into 1) the history and cur-
rent practice of government toward permitting trial access, 2) society's
interests favoring access, and 3) the government's reasons for denying
access.
Its first inquiry revealed a long tradition of public attendance at trials
extending from before the Norman Conquest to the years of American
colonization. 27 The English view that the "presumptive openness of the
trial" 28 is "one of the essential qualities of a court of justice"29 was, the
Court stated, incorporated into the earliest state laws. 0 The Court con-
cluded that "the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the
time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open"3 and that the same pre-
sumption holds true today.3 2
The fact that the case for access rests upon this strong tradition was
the crucial element in the Court's analysis. The Court referred to "[tihe
right of access to places traditionally open to the public,"33 thereby indi-
cating that the right to attend criminal trials derives from that broader
24. Id. (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 2842-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2821.
27. 100 S. Ct. at 2821-25. See generally Radin, The Right to A Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L. Q.
381 (1932). The fact that the tradition has been broken by the Star Chamber and occasion-
ally under compelling circumstances does not seem to affect the overall strength of the
tradition.
28. 100 S. Ct. at 2822.
29. Id. (quoting Daubney v. Cooper, 109 Eng. Rep. 438, 440 (K.B. 1829)).
30. 100 S. Ct. at 2822-23.
31. Id. at 2823.
32. Id. at 2825.
33. Id. at 2828. The tradition of openness was a major factor in the Court's ruling that a
trial for criminal contempt conducted wholly within a judge's chambers violated the consti-
tutional mandate of an open trial. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See generally The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 60, 69 (1979) which notes that the Court has
used the traditional openness analysis in other contexts as well.
[Vol. 15:741
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right. Its rationale for distinguishing Pell v. Procunier" and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co.,35 two cases relied upon by the Commonwealth, was
that the appellants in those cases sought access to prisons, and prisons do
not share the long tradition of openness with criminal trials.8 These sig-
nals and others within the Court's opinion demonstrate the pivotal role
played by tradition in the Court's analysis.
The Court next inquired into society's practical interests favoring pub-
lic access to trials and found "a nexus between openness, fairness, and the
perception of fairness."37 Three significant benefits to society were attrib-
uted to this nexus. First, openness was found to enhance the integrity of
trials by giving "assurance that the proceedings [are] conducted fairly to
all concerned, and... [by discouraging] perjury, the misconduct of par-
ticipants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.' ' " Second, "the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylatic purpose, provid-
ing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion."39 By bring-
ing the accusation and conviction or acquittal of a crime under the public
eye, open trials "reaffirm the temporarily lost feeling of security"40 that a
crime causes and satisfy "that latent 'urge to punish' "41 that might other-
wise be vented through vigilante-style self help. Third, open trials inspire
confidence and satisfaction from public observation of the fair adminis-
tration of justice. The rationale for unexpected verdicts may be seen by
everyone first-hand, so that the criminal process satisfies the appearance
of justice. The resulting confidence helps the system work more effec-
tively.42 Thus, the Court concluded that "[f]rom this unbroken, uncontra-
dicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past,
we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the
34. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
35. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). In both Pell and Saxbe the Court rejected challenges to prison
regulations forbidding press interviews of specific inmates. Essentially, the Court held in
both cases that the government could not be compelled to provide press access to these
prisoners because it did not provide such access to the public.
36. 100 S. Ct. at 2827 n.11.
37. Id. at 2824.
38. Id. at 2823. Accord, Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("press
serves to guarantee the fairness of trials"); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)
(press enhances fairness by placing officials under public scrutiny).
39. 100 S. Ct. at 2824.
40. Id. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492 (accusation, prosecution, and
conviction are of legitimate concern to the public).
41. 100 S. Ct. at 2824 (quoting Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Crim-
inal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1961).
42. 100 S. Ct. at 2825. See also Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM.
L. REv. 1308, 1309-10, 1323-26 (1979).
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very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."4
On the basis of these findings and the practical requirements of free
exercise of press and speech, the Court decided that the right of the pub-
lic to attend trials is entitled to constitutional protection. The Court was
impressed by the fact that "[tihe Bill of Rights was enacted against the
backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively open." The
Court also recognized that the "explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and
to publish concerning what takes place at a trial would lose much mean-
ing if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbi-
trarily."'45 Therefore, the opinion concluded, the first amendment guaran-
tees of speech and press "can be read as protecting the right of everyone
to attend trials.'4 Arbitrary court closures were thus deemed offensive to
the first amendment.
To determine whether Judge Taylor's closure order was constitution-
ally sound, the Court balanced the public's interests in open trials against
the Commonwealth's countervailing interests in a closed trial. Unfortu-
nately, the nature of the test is not clear because the record showed that
"the trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made
as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure
fairness; there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution for
the public or press to attend the trial.' '47 Having nothing in the record to
balance against society's interests, the Court's opinion ended abruptly
with the declaration that "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.' 4 8
It is prudent to note here some of the issues that the Court did not
address. The Richmond Newspapers holding is very narrow and must be
read according to its facts. A close reading reveals that the Court did not
43. 100 S. Ct. at 2825.
44. Id. at 2827.
45. Id.
46. Id. This is basically what Justice Powell asserted in his Gannett concurrence. 443 U.S.
at 397-401.
47. 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30. Accepted first amendment tests do not apply here because the
Court has never recognized a first amendment right of access to government proceedings.
Access cases should not be confused with cases dealing with prior restraint or with contempt
citations imposed by courts to prevent the publication of information already acquired. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (contempt citation for
publication of information concerning a judicial misconduct inquiry); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (gag order). See generally Note, The Right to Attend Crimi-
nal Hearings, supra note 42, at 1315-16.
48. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
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extend the public's right to attend civil trials.49 Nor did the Court provide
any indication of the strength of the right to attend criminal trials where
the public is excluded due to interests other than fairness, or special situ-
ations where the tradition of openness is lacking, such as juvenile trials or
those involving rape or incest.50 The Court also reserved comment on
whether the press enjoys any rights superior to those of the public.51 In
addition, the Court did not expressly state whether the right to attend
criminal trials applies to pretrial hearings. The plurality opinion will be
useful by analogy in future arguments, but it is not binding precedent on
any issue other than the right to attend criminal trials.52
Justices Stewart and Blackmun, in their separate concurring opinions,
show general agreement with the Court's analysis. Justice Stewart's only
significant deviation from the Court's view is his recognition of an
equivalent right to attend civil trials,53 a finding that the Court re-
served.5 Justice Blackmun found the Court's analysis "troublesome" be-
cause of its reliance on the first amendment as a source of protection for
the right to attend criminal trials.5 5 He did not elaborate on his concerns
beyond observing that "uncertainty marks the nature-and strictness-of
the standard of closure the Court adopts."56 However his opinion reveals
a preference for this sixth amendment solution he proposed in dissent in
Gannett.57
In trying to understand the reasons for Justice Blackmun's adherence
to the sixth amendment solution, one is reminded that the sixth amend-
ment is limited by its terms to trials.58 Thus, any right of access derived
49. Id. at 2829 n.17. See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 401 (1977).
50. For cases and comment on closures to protect juveniles and victims of sex offenses
from trauma, see J. COOK, CONSTITmONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED, TRIAL RIGHTS §§ 100-03
(1974); 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 439 (C. Torcia ed. 1975); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 1835 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
51. The cases have generally held that the press enjoys no rights greater than those of the
public. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 417 U.S.
843 (1974). But see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (restrictions against cameras and sound recorders are unreasonable when applied to
journalists because of their special needs in conveying information to the public).
52. Richmond Newspapers has been cited for its discussion of society's interests in public
proceedings. See In re National Broadcasting Company, Inc., No. 80-1345 (2d Cir. Oct. 1,
1980).
53. 100 S. Ct. at 2840.
54. Id. at 2829 n.17.
55. Id. at 2842.
56. Id.
57. See 443 U.S. at 406-48 Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. The sixth amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
1981]
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from the sixth amendment may not logically be extended by the courts to
confer a right of access to other government proceedings. The first
amendment right is derived from the broadly applicable speech and press
protections and could conceivably be extended to protect access wherever
it is sought. In spite of this initial advantage, the rationale behind the
sixth amendment right of access seems strained.s9 The sixth amendment
solution is not as flexible as the Court's first amendment approach within
the sphere of trials and cannot accommodate special circumstances which
may sometimes warrant closure. Although this recently articulated consti-
tutional right is untested and uncertain, it seems probable that the Court
will limit it to those proceedings which, like trials, are traditionally open
to the public. As more cases of this nature reach the the Court, the struc-
ture and extent of the first amendment right should become increasingly
more certain.
VI. THE STRUCTURAL ROLE ANALYSIS
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with the plurality
that, "without more, agreement of the trial judge and the parties cannot
constitutionally close a trial to the public."' 0 In reaching that conclusion,
Justice Brennan analyzed the facts according to the "structural role"
formula, which is substantially different from the traditional openness
formula used by the Court. The structural role formula is based upon the
theory that the first amendment "embodies more than a commitment to
free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has
a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican form of
self-government." 61 When application of this formula reveals that public
access to a particular government process substantially aids in advancing
the goals and efficiency of that process, the public has a right of access to
that process protected by the first amendment. Two principles govern
this analysis. "First, the case for a right of access has special force" when
the government historically and currently permits access to particular
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
59. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 33, at 66-68 (finding prior opinions
of the Court inconsistent with Justice Blackmun's arguments).
60. 100 S. Ct. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 2833 (emphasis in original).
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proceedings or information.8 2 Second, and most important, "the value of
access must be measured in specifics,"8 3 not broad "rhetorical statements
that all information bears upon public issues."' The format of the struc-
tural role analysis is similar to that of the Court's analysis in that both
balance history and current practice and the benefits to the press and
public against governmental interest in denying access. However, the
weight of the factors and the strictness of the tests are different.
Justice Brennan's analysis began with a survey of the government's
past and present practices in permitting access to trials. This was not as
extensive a survey as the Court's, but it too determined that tradition is
squarely behind the case for public access to trials.6 5 The second, crucial
phase of this analysis involved a determination of the degree to which
public access furthers the "practical purposes"68 of the trial. Justice Bren-
nan found that public access enhances the integrity of trial proceedings to
the benefit of both defendant and society. Access was found to safeguard
against the use of courts as weapons for the persecution and suppression
of religious and political philosophies. 67 It was also noted that access pro-
motes accurate factfinding because interested parties and witnesses may
come forward when they receive notice of trials in published accounts. 68
Similarly, the presence of spectators tends to impress witnesses with the
gravity of the proceedings and thereby encourages truthful testimony.6 9
These findings led Justice Brennan to conclude that public access sub-
stantially promotes the fair administration of justice, which is the pri-
mary aim of trials. In addition to benefiting the defendant, public access
was found to promote broad societal interest by demonstrating the fair-
ness of law to society while discouraging suspicion and disrespect which is
bred by secrecy.7 0 Justice Brennan's findings here were similar to the
Court's, but he placed special emphasis on the "pivotal role"71 played by
62. Id. at 2834.
63. Id.
64. Id. See generally Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 177-83 (1979).
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2834-37.
66. Id. at 2837. Cf. Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. at 30-38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (determination of the degree to which public access via the press furthers the functions
of prisons); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. 100 S. Ct. at 2836.
68. Id. at 2838.
69. Id. at 2839.
70. Id. at 2837.
71. Id. at 2838. Cf. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic soci-
ety is that the public should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what
happens there. .. ").
1981]
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trials and trial access in government. A finding that access plays a struc-
tural role in fostering self-government is a prerequisite to a grant of first
amendment protection under this analysis. Inspection of the broad
ramifications of trials revealed that
court rulings impose official and practical consequences upon members of
society at large. Moreover, judges bear responsibility for the vitally impor-
tant task of construing and securing constitutional rights. Thus, so far as
the trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as the initial fo-
rum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine governmental proceeding.7 2
Justice Brennan determined that public access is a vital check on the
courts as they perform these functions, "akin in purpose to the other
checks and balances that infuse our system of government."7 3 Because of
this important function and those functions benefiting the defendant,
Justice Brennan was compelled to conclude that "public access is an in-
dispensible element of the trial itself. Trial access, therefore, assumes
structural importance" in government. 4
On this basis, Justice Brennan declared the rule that trials are pre-
sumptively open. Like the Court, he did not divulge what "countervailing
interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption."75
Nevertheless, his opinion suggests that those interests must be so strong
as to justify a prior restraint on publication."6 Several times in his opin-
ion, Justice Brennan likened the protection deserved by the right of ac-
cess to the "almost insurmountable""' protection held by free speech and
press and invoked cases and language that are hallmarks of prior restraint
law. His sole example of a concern that may be sufficiently compelling to
overcome the presumption was national security-so far the only recog-
nized justification for prior restraint.78 These clues indicate that under
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2838.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2839.
75. Id.
76. Commentators have proposed the theory that trial closures are, for all practical pur-
poses, prior restraints and therefore unconstitutional under Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976). See, e.g., Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed
Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. Rav. 442 (1978). Several courts have agreed. See, e.g.,
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971). But see Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (closure differs from a gag order
in that the press is not told what it may or may not publish).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2833. See 427 U.S. at 559 (It is "the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.").
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.24. See Brown v. Glines, 100 S. Ct. 594, 609-11 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
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the structural role analysis, only national security interests may overcome
the presumption of open trials. Such a rule, if ever applied authorita-
tively, could be disastrous for the courts. Although Justice Brennan notes
that restrictions on access are permissible when reasonable and imposed
in the interests of decorum, 9 he does not exempt other closures from the
rigors of this test. Thus closures to protect juveniles and the privacy of
rape victims would not be allowed under this test, as they have been in
the past. 0 As a consequence, vicitms of sex crimes might be even less
willing to report offenses, knowing that they would have to recount their
experience before a crowded courtroom. The standards of the structural
role balancing test are too rigorous for practical application to trials. For-
tunately, it is unlikely that they will be applied by the Court as most of
the Justices seem to favor the more flexible and practical test adopted by
the Court.
VII. A PROPOSED FORMULA FOR CONSIDERATION OF CLOSURE MOTIONS
Although the Court did not expressly state what findings must be made
by a trial judge before ordering closure, a workable formula emerges from
the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers and Gannett. The follow-
ing formula includes the minimum standards for constitutionality.
Before a trial judge grants a motion to exclude the public and press
from a criminal proceeding, he should first determine that there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that their presence will interfere with the defendant's
right to a fair trial. The threat of interference must be more than merely
speculative, but it need not be certain.81 Evidence such as unusually high
levels of publicity contributes to the requisite showing of substantial like-
lihood.8 2 The public's presence must also threaten the defendant's right
79. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.23.
80. See note 50 supra. One may infer from Justice Brennan's mention of national security
interests as a justification for closing trials that the structural role analysis would apply to
all closures, for whatever reason.
81. Justice Powell suggested that a likelihood of jeopardy is a sufficient threat to warrant
consideration of closing a pretrial suppression hearing. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
at 400. Justice Blackmun would require a showing of substantial probability but this seems
too great a burden to put on the defendant initially. Id. at 441. See also ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL & FRE PRESS § 3.2(c).
82. The judge must consider all relevant factors in evaluating the likelihood of the threat.
See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (population density of the forum);
United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 941 (1973) (span of
time between publicity and trial); United States v. Bletterman, 279 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1960)
(inflammatory character of the publicity); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, reh. denied, 314 U.S. 706 (1941) (no showing of public
turbulence).
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to a fair trial. Richmond Newspapers and Gannett deal only with clo-
sures to protect the rights of the defendant. This test is not applicable to
closures to protect trade secrets, maintain decorum, safeguard national
security and the like.
The judge must next determine that "alternative solutions"83 cannot
effectively diminish the threat to a fair trial. Alternative solutions include
continuance," change of venue85 and venire,8s sequestration of the jury
and witnesses, 87 voir dire,88 and even counseling of the press on its jour-
nalistic responsibilities.8 9 Admittedly, these alternatives present difficul-
ties, but none are unmanageable.90 Only upon a showing that these solu-
tions would fail may a judge resort to the extreme remedy of closure.
Third, any restrictions imposed by the court on public access must be
carefully tailored so as to extend no further than is reasonably necessary
to ensure a fair trial.9 1 Every effort must be made to accomodate the pub-
83. 100 S. Ct. at 2830. See 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring). Id. at 442 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (Court decried the
lack of consideration of alternative solutions).
84. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
85. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R3d 17
(1970 & Supp. 1980).
86. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRAL & FREE PREss § 3.4 (C).
87. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973). For a discussion of voir dire in Federal courts, see Annot., 28 A.L.R. FED. 26
(1976).
89. "It is not asking too much to suggest that those who exercise First Amendment rights
in newspapers or broadcasting enterprises direct some effort to protect the rights of an ac-
cused to a fair trial by unbiased jurors." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 560.
The judge may also proscribe extrajudicial comments to the press by attorneys and court
personnel. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 361. But a judge may not forbid the press to
publish information already within its possession or contained in court records unless publi-
cation would present a clear and present danger sufficient to justify a prior restraint. Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 556-70; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
Nor may the judge hold a reporter in contempt of court for his reporting of information
learned in open court. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
90. 100 S. Ct. at 2830. See generally REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE
JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS - FAIR TRiAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
91. 443 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 444 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accord,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (statute regulating freedom to act in the
exercise of religion must not unduly infringe upon that freedom). But in applying restric-
tions to attendance, the judge must bear in mind that the defendant's right to a fair trial is
"superior". 100 S. Ct. at 2821 (dictum). Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (press and
public serve an important function at trial but must necessarily be subject to the mainte-
nance of absolute fairness at trial). See also Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Infor-
mation, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971).
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lic's right to attend the trial. Thus, the closure may not extend to parts of
the trial where the public's presence does not pose a threat 2
These findings may be made only after the court has provided a hear-
ing on the motion to close the courtroom. The press and public must have
a reasonable opportunity to voice their objections.9 3 However the judge
need not provide a forum for each excluded spectator to air his grievances
so long as he entertains representative objections. The hearing may be
informal, but it must generate a reliable record for appellate review."
It is difficult to imagine any set of circumstances which could justify
the closure of a trial under this test. The prophylactic resources available
to the judge for the protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial are
extremely flexible and effective. These resources are not as effective in
pretrial proceedings, however, and it is likely that some pretrial criminal
proceedings may be closed in conformity with this test. Admittedly, the
test is very strict, but first amendment freedoms do not easily yield.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Richmond Newspapers has made it clear that the public has a first
amendment right to attend criminal trials; Gannett is now little more
than a case interpreting the sixth amendment to protect only the accused.
The significance of the Richmond Newspapers decision obviously tran-
scends the limited realm of criminal trials. It suggests the existence of a
broad first amendment right of access to all government proceedings that
are traditionally open to the public. The Court should, in developing that
right, continue to move as it has in the past, cautiously and closely
tethered to the facts of the case before it. As the area of first amendment
freedoms is explosive, the cases within it are frequently distorted. It is
hoped that the Court will soon articulate the scope of the right to attend
criminal trials and pretrial hearings, as well as the broader right of access,
without sacrificing precision.
Christopher C. Spencer
92. See United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949).
93. 443 U.S. at 401 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 445-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Neither Justice Powell nor Justice Blackmun would seem to require notice beyond the
courtroom, as it would cause unreasonable delays in the progress of the trial. But see Note,
The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, supra note 42, at 1328 (1978) (suggesting that
those with a significant interest in the trial deserve notice).
94. 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30; id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justices do not seem
disposed to substitute the claims of counsel at oral argument for the recorded contemporary
findings of the trial judge.
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